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We evaluate the role played by loan supply shocks in the decline of investment and industrial
production during the Great Depression in Germany from 1927 to 1932. We identify loan supply
shocks in the context of a time varying parameter vector autoregression with stochastic volatility.
Our results indicate that credit constraints were a significant driver of industrial production
between 1927 and 1932, supporting the view that a structurally weak banking sector was an
important contributor to the German Great Depression. We find further that loan supply shocks
were an important driver of investment in the early phase of the depression, between 1927 and
1929, but not between 1930 and 1932. We suggest possible explanations for this puzzle and
directions for future research.
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If to understand the Great Depression is the holy grail of macroeconomics, then Germany may be
the place to start the quest.1 Germany’s depression has received particular scholarly attention,
because of the nation’s position in the nexus of war debts, reparations and US foreign lending. The
collapse of this triangular system of capital flows, which linked the largest industrial economies,
transmitted deflationary shocks through the Gold Standard. Thus, understanding the causes of
Germany’s depression is crucial for identifying the culprits of the world-wide depression.2 Moreover,
the German slump was not only particularly early, but also extremely deep with a collapse in
GDP and unemployment figures exceeding those of most advanced countries, thereby effectively
contributing to the rise of National Socialism. Indeed, recent research provides evidence that both
the austerity policies of the Bru¨ning administration between 1930 and 1932, as well as the banking
crisis of 1931, were direct contributors to the rise of Nazism (Galofre´-Vila` et al., 2017; Doerr et al.,
2019).
This paper analyzes one particular mechanism that we demonstrate contributed to the depth of
the German Depression: the bank lending channel. In his seminal work on the U.S. Great Depression,
Bernanke (1983) emphasizes the role of disruptions in financial intermediation and supply of bank
loans. This non-monetary channel was able to explain declines in U.S. GDP over and above the
effect of monetary shocks, the primary cause in the story of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Previous
studies on the interwar German economy have stressed the structural weakness of the German credit
banks after the hyperinflation (Balderston, 1991), the possibility of constraints on bank lending after
the stock market crash of May 1927 (Voth, 2003), and the persistence of a banking crisis even after
a general bank holiday and the introduction of capital controls in July 1931 (Balderston, 1993). Yet,
there exists, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical evidence on the existence and impact of loan
supply shocks.
We estimate a Bayesian time-varying parameter vector autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model with
monthly German data ranging from 1925:1 to 1934:12. This approach is well-suited for our purposes,
as it allows us to identify loan supply shocks in addition to standard macroeconomic shocks. The
extreme macroeconomic volatility during the late 1920’s and early 1930’s would make inferences
from a simpler VAR model highly inaccurate. The TVP-VAR is able to lessen issues associated
with changes in the prevailing macroeconomic regime, and has been successfully applied to studying
changing macro-financial linkages in the context of recent financial crises (Bijsterbosch and Falagia-
rda, 2015; Gambetti and Musso, 2017). Perhaps most importantly, the model allows for stochastic
1Romer (1993) argues that the epicenter of the Great Depression lies in the US, which should make it the focal point
of research. Bernanke (1995) argues for a comparative approach across countries to study forces of the depression.
We believe that Germany, for its economic size and the reasons outlined in this paragraph, deserves as much attention
from researchers as the US.
2The treaty of Versailles in the aftermath of WWI imposed reparations on Germany to be paid to Britain and
France. In turn, France and Britain owed large sums of war debts to the US. After German hyperinflation had
eliminated German savings in the early 1920s, US credits stabilized the German economy and indirectly financed
the transfer of reparations to France and Britain. When capital flows reversed in 1930/31, deflationary shocks were
transmitted to other nations via the Gold Standard. The literature has not settled on which party in the triangle is
most to blame. Kindleberger (1986) and more recently Tooze (2014) point at the U.S., Irwin (2010) and Eichengreen
(1992) emphasize the role of France, and Ferguson and Temin’s (2003) contribution puts much responsibility on
Germany.
volatility in the shocks, whereby it does not confound time-varying macroeconomic or financial
instability with structural change in the relationship between credit and economic conditions.
Our results shed light to four key issues in the literature on the German Great Depression. First,
as the German Hyperinflation had deteriorated the financial sector’s balance sheets, our results
empirically support the hypothesis that the rebuilding process itself contributed to the credit banks
sluggish performance and constrained lending to the real economy (Balderston, 1991). Second, we
lend indirect support to Voth (2003) who argued that the stock market crash initiated Germany’s
slide into depression, but provides no evidence on the bank lending channel, which he hypothesizes
was the crucial channel of how the shock was transmitted to the economy as a whole. Third, the
austerity policies of the Bru¨ning administration between 1930 and 1932 and the twin crisis of 1931
were aggravated by the debt-deflation effects of a credit constrained economy. Finally, while the
German Great Depression had many causes, it resembled the depression in other countries in terms
of having the banking sector as an exacerbating factor (Bernanke, 1995; Grossman, 1994).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After an overview of the debate on the
economic history of post-inflation Weimar Germany, we provide details on the structural weakness
of the banking sector and elaborate why we should expect the bank lending channel to be operative.
The subsequent sections discuss the econometric approach and the results. Finally, we discuss the
limitations and contributions of our study and explore areas for future research.
2 The Great Depression in Germany: An Overview
Much ink has been spilled on the causes of the German Great Depression. Until the seminal work by
Borchardt (1979) the consensus of economic historians was that deflationary and budget-balancing
policies of Heinrich Bru¨ning, chancellor from 1930 to 1932, caused the depression.3 According to
the Keynesian paradigm, alternatives to austerity were available and feasible. Within the classic
Keynesian framework there are several possibilities to explain the crisis. One interpretation is
that restrictive monetary policy between 1925 and 1929 raised Germany’s interest rate above the
world rate of interest. The balance of payments equilibrium was restored after 1929 when the
government reacted by cutting expenditure and increasing taxes.4 A second possibility, famously
advanced by Kindleberger (1986), is that an autonomous movement of capital, caused by a decline
in US lending, shifted the balance of payments equilibrium to a higher interest rate. This line of
reasoning, which sees the causes outside Germany, has been dismantled by the seminal work of
Peter Temin (1971), who showed that the downturn in Germany began already in 1927, too early
to have been caused by an autonomous decline in US foreign lending. The alternative Keynesian
explanation would thus be that output began to decline either because of a shock to German exports
or through a reduction in autonomous investment. The traditional Keynesian interpretation became
the subject of heavy critique with the work of Knut Borchardt (1979, 1980). Borchardt’s revisionist
argumentation is based on distributional conflict and inept attempts for their resolution, especially
excessive wage increases during the 1920s. This depressed profits and created a very unfavorable
3c.f. the early and influential work by Haberler (1937)
4For a graphical illustration of this line of argumentation ork the reader is referred to Ritschl (1998).
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position of the German economy during the World Depression. During the Great Depression the
German government was cut off from access to credits because of the burden caused in the 1920s. The
deflationary policies were thus a predicament and not intentional policies. It follows that economic
expansion from 1933 onwards was only made possible by the removal of the restrictions that caused
the compelling deflationary policies of Bru¨ning.
Ritschl (1998) offers a solution that reconciles the Borchardt hypotheses within a Keynesian
analytic framework. Introducing the reparations problem in a sovereign debt model he argues
that at a certain debt threshold further credits to Germany were denied. The connection between
reparations and the German economy is found in the missing incentive structure of the different
reparation regimes. Because the Dawes-regime, from 1924 to 1929, gave Germany no incentive for
a real-resource transfer of reparations, she subverted paying reparations by accumulating massive
foreign debts. This strain on the balance of payments is ultimately responsible for the depth of the
German crisis.
Crucially, the Young plan 1929/1930 represents a regime change as the seniority of commercial
credits over reparations reverses. Because the Young plan effectively increased the public debt
overhang by the amount of reparations and above the amount deemed acceptable by private creditors,
credit constrains became binding. This forced Germany into deflation.
A challenge for this interpretation is that the German Depression had already been underway
by 1928 and seems to have started in late 1927 as several indicators of investment show (Temin,
1971; Ritschl, 1999). In 1928 net investment fell by 15 percent, most of it driven by lower inventory
investment. From 1927 to 1929, the fall in investment was 55 percent, enough to explain the fall
in national production. It needs to be stressed, however, that investment did not see a very sharp
downturn. Instead the German economy gradually slid into Depression from 1927 onwards. If the
origin of the German Depression was internal, it might very well be that foreign creditors started
to withdraw capital once investment deficiencies became obvious and the viability of the German
economy was put into question. Priority only became pressing once capital inflows ceased (Ferguson
and Temin, 2003).
The tests that such a hypothesis must pass are multidimensional. Was the beginning of the
German Depression caused internally? Are there feedback mechanisms that can cause an initially
relatively minor event to have a negative effect that grows over time? Is this enough to cause an
outflow of capital?
Voth (2003) gives an answer to the first question that goes beyond Temin’s claim of an au-
tonomous fall in investment. He provides qualitative evidence that Hjalmar Schacht, president of
the Reichsbank, perceived the stock market boom of 1926/27 as a bubble and his econometric evi-
dence suggests that pricking the non-existing bubble, by threatening the big banks to restrict credit,
had significant adverse effects on investment. To answer the second question Voth suggests three
possible transmission mechanism. First, the stock market crash had a negative effect on business
sentiment. Second, the collapse in trading volume made German shares less liquid causing trans-
action costs to rise significantly. Consequently, the stock markets role in allocating capital became
more difficult. Third, the destruction of equity values lowered the value of collateral and affected
investment via the bank lending channel. Specifically, Voth argues that the stock market crash may
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have been instrumental for the reduction in credit and the curtailment of business investment.
Our emphasis on Voth’s third transmission mechanism, the bank lending channel, is supported
by research which has shown the close relationship between asset price changes and financial inter-
mediation (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Gan, 2007). Yet, evidence for the bank lending channel seems to
be nonexistent for the German depression. But as the next section will show, the structural weakness
of the German credit banks during the period suggests that the bank lending channel could be a
powerful mechanism to explain the collapse of investment.
Lastly, the bank lending channel may have been a key contributor to the rise of the Nazi Party
towards the end of the Weimar Republic. In a recent paper Doerr et al. (2019) show how the failure
of Jewish-led Danatbank in 1931 induced a strong reduction in the wage bill for connected firms.
This led to increasing city-level unemployment in cities with more Danat-connected firms. These
cities saw increased anti-Semitism and increased Nazi Party support. While Doerr et al. (2019) do
not investigate the specific mechanism through which Danat-connected firms reduced their wage
bill, an increase in the real costs of credit intermediation because of the bank-failure as in Bernanke
(1983) is the obvious candidate.
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3 The German credit banks and the development of the short
term foreign credit market
Although Balderston stresses the weak structure of the German credit banks, this story has little
to no place in his narrative about the collapse of investment (Balderston, 1993, chpt. 5). Moreover,
Balderston (1983, 1993) has argued against a collapse in business confidence as a cause for the fall of
investment because the downturn, he contends, started not in inventories but in infrastructure fixed
investment and housebuilding. Instead, Balderson stresses the importance of the German bond
market, which had been severely impaired by hyperinflation and received further blows because
of Reichsbank President Schacht’s hostility to foreign borrowing and Parker Gilbert’s, the Agent
General for Reparations, critic of German public finances.5 This increased the long term interest
rate and thereby exerted a negative effect on investment.
Yet, we claim that the banking sector played an important part in supplying loans to German
businesses and that it needs to be connected to the decline in output. Moreover, to the extent that
market-based and bank-based finance are substitutes, the latter cannot be excluded from a narrative
of financial constraints. We will hence briefly describe the structural weakness of the banking sector
between 1927 and 1931, which can make for a large bank lending channel.
Table 1 shows advances, which are tantamount to loans, and equity plus reserves of the Berlin
great branch banks. The Berlin great branch banks in 1929 consisted of Deutsche Bank und Disconto-
Gesellschaft, Darmsta¨dter und Nationalbank, Dresdener Bank and Commerz- u. Privatbank. To-
gether they accounted for more than 20 percent of the banking sector’s total assets at the end of
1920s. More importantly for our analysis, they accounted for about half of all advances (Debitoren)
in the banking system. We observe that advances increased every year until 1929, with the largest
absolute increases in 1926/27 and 1928/29. The equity base of these banks had been eroded dur-
ing the hyperinflation and equity plus reserves (column 4) could not keep up with the increases in
advances, but was actually decreasing between 1927 and 1929. The banks accepted lower liquidity
ratios in the 1920s than they did before the war, because of more severe competition from foreign
banks, smaller savings banks and from other joint-stock banks. Competition for deposits decreased
the credit banks’ profitability. On the one hand, lower profits prevented the banks from issuing
new securities because this would have impaired dividends. On the other hand, banks were forced
to undertake more adventurous balance sheet expeditions by increasing their advances (Balderston,
1991).
A caveat of the series in table (1) is that it excludes the large provincial banks, who often
maintained regional branch networks similar to the structure of the great branch banks. The large
provincial banks, of which Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank (BHW), Allgemeine Deutsche
Credit-Anstalt (ADAC), Bayerische Vereinsbank and Barmer Bankverein were the most important,
stood in direct competition with the great branch banks, not the least because their loan portfolios
were dominated by industrial loans for which they competed with the great branch banks (Schnabel,
2004). However, the data series we use in our econometric analysis in section (4) includes the BHW
5Schacht was responsible for the withdrawal of the exemption from the capital yield tax in December 1926 that
foreigners hitherto enjoyed. Although the exemption was reintroduced in June 1927, Schacht then started to pressure
the Advisory Council for Foreign Credits to enforce stricter criteria of eligibility for foreign loans.
5
and ADAC. For the descriptive purpose of this section about the structural weakness of the banking
sector which can explain the presence of the bank lending channel, the series in table (1) is regarded
as sufficient.
Both, the series in table (1) and the series used in section (4) exclude the two great non-branch
banks Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft (BHG) and Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft. Yet, we don’t think
these two institutions are important for our analysis since these banks worked mostly with a small
number of wealthy and homogeneous clients (Schnabel, 2004).6 For the remainder of the paper we
will use the term great banks (Grossbanken) for the set of banks which we analyze, which excludes
the great non-branch banks but includes the two large provincial banks BHW and ADAC.
Table 1: Advances and Equity + Reserves of 4 Credit banks* (Mio. RM)
Balance at
end Year
Advances (Debitoren) Equity + Reserves
Total a) secured b) unsecured
1913 2948.7 2208 740.6 1490.8
1924 1478.4 780.1 692.3 621.3
1925 2300.7 1462 838.7 629.7
1926 2848.5 2113.7 734.8 720.4
1927 3795.7 2767.5 1028.2 769.8
1928 4287.6 2643.8 1362.8 757.1
1929 5311.4 3957.1 1354.3 714.5
1930 5286.4 4026.1 1260.3 779,5
1931 4381.3 3198 1183.3 529.2
1932 4053.9 3097.3 956.6 444.2
*Deutsche Bank und Disc.-Ges., Dresdener Bank, Commerz- u. Privatbank including their absorbed institutions
Source: (Bank, 1927-1933, 1928, p.514)
One way to look at the liquidity of the great banks is by considering advances as a percentage of
short-term liabilities (i.e. mainly deposits) or liquid assets as a percentage of short-term liabilities.
Liquid assets include till cash, deposits at note-issuing and other banks, and bills of exchange. These
ratios are plotted in figure (1), which also demonstrates their inverse relationship. The solid line
represents the advances to short-term liabilities ratio.
Five months after the stock market crash of May 1927 this ratio stood at 56.7 percent, which
is the highest value for the period between 1924 and April 1931. The fact that this ratio increased
constantly between the stock market crash and October 1927 can imply that banks were trying to
accommodate clients by allowing longer repayment periods for loans.7 But from October onwards,
the advances ratio reached a level higher than what bankers felt comfortable with (Habedank, 1981).
The banks increasingly referred customers to foreign banks for advances on their goods, which can be
seen in the steep increase of reimbursement credits (i.e.Warenvorschu¨sse (Statistisches Reichsamt,
1936, No. 132)). But because German banks acted as intermediaries on these advances a contingent
risk remained on the banks’ balance sheets. The German banks were willing to take this risk. As
table (2) shows, German banks’ and non-banks’ foreign short-term debt increased at least until 1929.
6Average loans and deposits where higher for these two banks. This implies lower verification costs when granting
these loans and we would expect the bank lending channel not to be as significant.
7This is consistent with evidence from mid-1927 of increased delays in the settlement of trade debts. See footnote
25 in Balderston (1983).
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Figure 1: Liquidity Ratios of the Great Banks
The series are taken from Table 5.12 in Balderston (1993).
Especially, ”liabilities for clients”, the balance sheet counterpart to reimbursement credits, show a
disproportional increase from 1927 onwards. If borrowers had the opportunity to switch to foreign
banks for funding, this poses a potential problem for the bank lending channel. Yet, we think this
effect is negligible. Reimbursement credits were only granted to companies that were generating
enough foreign exchange to service their debt and thereby the substitution towards foreign credit
should have happened only in the export sector. In any case, if there was a substitutability between
domestic and foreign credits, our empirical estimates below are biased against the bank lending
channel hypothesis. In this light, our findings provide even stronger support for credit constraints
being a meaningful driver of the economy.
Together, the increase in advances and short-term foreign financing indicates that the German
economy in 1927 moved from financing itself in the bond market towards bank based finance. An
economy, such as Germany in the period from 1927 to 1932, so reliant on bank loans should be
particularly vulnerable to loan supply shocks.
We are not in a position to judge whether this increased dependence on bank loans was caused
by Schacht’s and Gilbert’s critique of foreign borrowing and the impairment of the German bond
market as argued by Balderston.8 Nor are we able to judge whether the initial shock that caused
the downturn in investment is to be found in the collapse of the bond market, a change in business
sentiments or the stock market crash. Yet, neither of these would by itself have had the power to
drive the German economy into depression. Whatever the initial shock, without a severely credit
constrained economy, it could have been absorbed by the banking system.
The motor of recession had started in mid to late 1927 and the narrowing trade deficit in 1928
8Note for example that a collapse in business sentiment could cause borrowers to switch towards bank loans. In
periods with low future profitability when reputation effects are important borrowers will choose monitored debt
(bank loans) over non-monitored debt (bond issues) (Diamond, 1991).
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Table 2: Short-term liabilities of 92 Credit banks and estimated total short-term debt owed to















1925 4588 837 391 4000
1926 5658 1312 300 5100
1927 7632 2485 521 8600
1928 9825 3768 1136 12000
1929 11866 4020 1769 15700
1930 13382 3880 2062 15300
1931 10580 1530 2068 13100
1932 7869 615 1324 9700
1933 7157 527 1116 8000
Notes: The second column of this table states the total amount of short-term debts of 92 credit banks without
interbank deposits. Together columns 3 and 4 then state the total amount of short-term debt of these 92 credit
banks owed to foreigners. Column 4 is an estimate of the total foreign short-term debt including non-banks.
Source: (Bank, 1927-1933, 1928, p.514) and (Untersuchungsausschuss fu¨r das Bankenwesen, 1933, p.512)
reveals that the boom in Germany was coming to an end. Falling interest rates went alongside an
increase in deposits that was faster than the increase in bills. Both the falling interest rate and the
slackening demand for bills are signs that the IS curve was shifting to the left between 1928 and
1929.
Because of the low capital of banks and the impaired balance sheets we suspect that the credit
banks exerted significant pressure on the German economy not only in late 1927 but also at other
times during the period 1927 to 1932. Specifically, it is likely that the bank lending channel operated
during the fiscal crisis between October and December 1929, when the great credit banks lost deposits
to Switzerland and the Netherlands. Contrary to the usual seasonal decrease in advances, they did
not fall this time. Neither did liquid assets show their usual seasonal upswing.
Finally, we expect the bank lending channel to be operating when Germany was hit by a twin
crisis in June/July 1931. Although both the currency and banking crisis persisted into 1932, we
think that the banking crisis was more damaging than the currency crisis after capital controls were
introduced in July 1931 because of the bank lending channel. While the decision to hold Reichsmarks
against foreign currency was marginal, the decision to hold Reichsmarks rather than real assets was
no longer marginal in an era of continuously falling prices, i.e. the steady appreciation in the value
of money. A debt deflation occurred and led to heavy disinvestments in stocks of inventory and
massive bankruptcies.
Summing up, we expect the German economy to be susceptible to loan supply shocks for the
whole period between May 1927 and January 1933, because of its low equity base, the high level of
illiquid advances and the competition for short-term deposits.
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4 Empirical Approach
We estimate a time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) to study how changes in
credit impacted the economy.9 The motivation for doing this arises from the high degree of economic
and financial instability observed during the interwar years, which could make results from static
VARs misleading. The TVP-VAR is sufficiently flexible to allow for regime changes between financial
and real economic variables, while also being able to deal with changing macroeconomic volatility.
This flexibility is necessary when studying periods of financial instability. Indeed, the TVP-VAR
has recently been used to study the impact of credit supply shocks in the context of the Great
Recession.10 More broadly, it has been shown to display good forecasting performance, even when
applied to data incorporating different economic regimes (D’Agostino et al., 2013).
The TVP-VAR with ρ lags and N endogenous variables is specified as follows:
yt = µt +
ρ∑
i=1
Bi,tyt−i + νt ; var(νt) = Ωt (1)
Where µt are time-varying constants, Bi,t is an N ×N coefficient matrix corresponding the ith
lags of the N endogenous variables y. νt are error terms and Ωt contain the variances of the errors.





Where At is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal, governing the contemporaneous
covariances between the coefficients:
At =

1 0 · · · 0
a21,t 1 · · · 0





an1,t · · · ann−1,t 1

(3)
Σt, meanwhile holds the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix:
Σt =

σ1,t 0 · · · 0





0 · · · 0 σn,t
 (4)




With t ∼ N(0, In)
9The model is based on work by Primiceri (2005).
10Gambetti and Musso (2017); Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015).
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This decomposition is particularly helpful for modelling the dynamics of the parameters, which
are assumed to follow random walks. In order to illustrate this, define an (Nρ + 1) ×N matrix of
all the coefficients as follows: βt = vec([µ,B1,t, ...Bρ,t]). Furthermore, define hi,t = lnσi,t, i.e. the
logarithm of diagonal elements of the covariance matrix.
We can then write the random walk processes governing the parameter evolution as follows:
βt = βt−1 + et; var(et) = Q (6)
ln(hi,t) = ln(hi,t−1) + zi,t; var(zi,t) = wi (7)
aij,t = aij,t−1 + vi,t; var(vi,t) = si (8)
The matrices Q, S and W (the latter two have diagonal elements si and wi respectively) are the
hyperparameters governing the variances of the model states.
Even in the TVP-VAR context, a significant problem in the present case is the high degree of
instability in the economic variables. If the underlying Bayesian priors are left relatively uncon-
strained, draws of Q might not be positive definite, which causes draws of βt to ”explode”, leading
to serious problems with the numerical stability of the algorithm and difficulty replicating the results.
It would be possible to select only draws that are stationary, but this approach has been shown to
lead to biased results (Koop and Potter, 2011). This issue can nevertheless be mitigated by using
priors that lead to some degree of shrinkage. We therefore modify the estimation algorithm by
Primiceri (2005) to allow for the ‘data-based priors’ by Korobilis (2014), which extends approaches
from the recent prior-selection literature for univariate regression to the VAR context (Belmonte
et al., 2014). These priors allow the data to have a considerable degree of influence on the amount
of shrinkage that a given set of parameters take, which leads to increased stability especially for
parameters which would otherwise cause unstable draws. The attractiveness of this prior choice is
further increased by the relatively short span of our sample. Moreover, no shrinkage is imposed on
the prior for the variance of the shocks, which can be an especially important feature of the series
examined in the context of the Great Depression.
We estimate this TVP-VAR over the period from 1925:1 to 1934:12 using monthly German data.
All variables are seasonally adjusted.11 The VAR model has three lags, which has been selected
based on the Deviance Information Criterion, outlined by Chan and Grant (2016). Estimating the
model with four lags yields similar results.12 Estimating the model with five or six lags leads to
numerical instability.
The variables that we include in our specification are: investment (proxied by the production of
investment goods); the index of industrial production (IP); the call money rate (r); and advances
(credit). We chose the call money rate over the private discount rate because the latter shows
no movement between October 1932 and May 1934 and therefore causes computational problems.
Figure A.1 in the appendix plots both interest rates. The call money rate shows considerably more
volatility and is usually above the private discount rate. Apart from that the two series exhibit strong
co-movement. We achieve identification in the impulse responses by using Cholesky-decomposition
11Seasonal adjustment is done using the X-13 ARIMA method (Bureau, 2016).
12The impact of credit shocks on investment become weaker, but still positive in this specification.
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with the following variable ordering: y = [Investment, IP, credit, r]′.
Our credit series are advances of the great credit banks, which include Deutsche Bank, Dresdner
Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, and Allgmeine Deutsche Credit-
Anstalt including all institutions absorbed by these banks during the period. The series comprises
about half of all advances granted by the banking system.13 Advances are tantamount to loans,
given that the majority of them were secured by some kind of asset. Moreover, these loans are
almost exclusively loans to the non-bank private sector since business with government institutions
was conducted mainly by the Staats- und Landesbanken and interbank loans were usually granted
using bank bills or nostro accounts.14 The series that we use is thus well suited to evaluate the effect
of credit constraints on production.
Advances were reported only on a bimonthly basis between 1925 and 1927 and we log-linearly
interpolate the series to fill the gaps. These years are not incorporated into our impulse responses.
The data comes from official statistics published in Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, 1937), Wagemann
(1936) and Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1928). Table (A.1) in the appendix lists the exact
composition and description of the data.
5 Results
Figure 2 shows impulse response functions of industrial production (IP) and investment to a shock
in loans over a horizon of 12 months. The solid line shows the impact of a credit shock on a given
variable and horizon. More specifically, this line is the point-wise median response at each forecast
horizon. The dashed lines indicate the 86th and 14th percentiles of the draws from the MCMC
algorithm, commonly used in Bayesian statistics.15
The left-hand side figure shows the median impulse response of industrial production for the
years 1927-1932, whereas the right-hand side one shows the response of investment. Both of these
variables responded to positive credit shocks, with industrial production rising 0.25% and investment
rising 0.05% after a 1% credit shock. These results clearly support the hypothesis that credit shocks
were a meaningful driver of economic conditions amidst the German economic downturn. The
structural weaknesses in the Germany banking system in the late 1920s meant that their ability to
provide credit was significantly constrained, whereby the domestic economy responded substantially
to changes in bank lending. Moreover, the significance of the results suggests that regardless of what
financing alternatives existed for bank loans, they were clearly insufficient to overcome the impact
of the domestic banks’ weaknesses.16
13The period that we study is marked by waves of amalgamations. Deutsche Bank merged with Disconto Gesellschaft
in 1929, as did Commerzbank and Mitteldeutsche Credit bank. The second largest bank in 1931, Darmsta¨dter und
Nationalbank, was absorbed by Dresdner Bank following its bankcruptcy in 1931. In November 1929 advances from
the banks in our series accounted for 54% of all advances in the banking system as reported in Die Bank (1927-1933).
The monthly magazine Die Bank (1927-1933) reported aggregate balance sheet statistics of all credit banks, state-
owned banks (Staats- und Landesbanken) and Girozentralen and thereby excludes mortgage banks, savings banks
and the private bankers. These latter type of banks traditionally had a negligible share in granting direct loans to
industry.
14Advances by credit banks to other banks made up only 5.9% of all advances in November 1929 as reported in
Bank (1927-1933).
15This is because models typically express high degrees of dispersion at the extreme quantiles.
16If alternative forms of financing would have been readily available and easily substitutable for bank loans, we
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of industrial production and investment from credit
An alternative view of these results can be gained from figure 3, which shows that the impulse
responses of IP and especially investment were time-varying. Credit was an important driver of
industrial production throughout the period at issue, whereby credit shocks at any given moment
could have influenced the economy. This supports our argument of a structurally weak banking
sector in Germany. At the same time, note that the impact of credit on investment was most
significant before 1930.
The time-varying impact of credit to investment and economic conditions comes to the fore
more strongly in the forecast error variance decompositions shown in figure 4. These tell us that
credit shocks could explain between 65% to 70% of fluctuations in industrial production itself in any
given year between 1925-1935, and between 5% and 20% of changes in investment in these years.
Therefore, the shocks in credit are likely to have been especially strong contributors to the growth
and the subsequent decline in industrial production, which is likely to have been a key channel
through which credit constraints transmitted to the economy more broadly.
Investment, as our literature review above suggests, may have been driven by factors pertaining
to the financial markets more broadly as opposed to the banking system alone. In particular, we
consider the reversal of international capital flows in 1930/31 and the decline in bond issuance and
long-term financing abroad as a separate cause for the fall of investment. Hence, we add domestic and
foreign bond issuance to our model in the appendix (A). Yet, our indicator for market-based finance
has no impact on industrial production or investment and the effect of bank credit is unaffected by
the inclusion of the new variable. This suggests that other factors pertaining to firms investment
decisions, such as short-run ex ante real interest rates or expected profits, may have been more
important drivers of investment between 1930 and 1933 and we acknowledge that this is a question
would expect the impulse response of economic conditions to loans to be less significant.
12
Figure 3: Time-varying impulse responses of industrial production and investment to credit shocks
ripe for further research.
The impulse responses of loans to shocks in industrial production and investment are plotted
in figure 5. What this figure tells us is that banks did not increase their lending even as economic
conditions improved. If they did, we would expect bank lending to respond positively to shocks to
industrial production. Combined with the other results in this section, what emerges is a picture of
a credit constrained economy. This is an important finding in so far as it provides an explanation for
the relatively low level of investment of Weimar Germany’s economy. Previous studies have sought
an explanation for the low level of investment either in excessive wages (Ritschl, 1990) or excessive
interest rates (Voth, 1995). While we don’t deny that either one of these explanations may have
had an effect on investment, our results indicate that new investment was also hampered by a credit
constrained economy.
Indeed, as shown in figure 6, we find support for the argument that interest rate shocks influenced
German investment especially during the depth of the depression in 1932. Together with our results
in figure 3, this can be interpreted as saying that interest rate shocks were more important than
credit shocks for investment in the German economy at the height of the crisis. In other years,
however, interest rate shocks did not have as significant an impact on investment as credit did.
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Figure 4: Time-varying forecast error variance decomposition of shocks to credit after 12 months
Figure 5: Impulse responses of credit from industrial production and investment shocks
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of industrial production and investment from interest rate shocks
6 Conclusion
This is the first study to test for the presence of the bank lending channel during one of the most
dramatic periods in German and global economic history. We estimate time-varying parameter
vector autoregressions to evaluate the importance of credit constraints between 1924 and 1934. These
methods are able to accommodate the significant changes that occurred in the German financial
system during the period, and therefore offer a new approach to contributing to the discussion on
the causes of the Great Depression in Germany.
We demonstrate that bank lending was an important driver of economic fluctuations in 1924-
1934. Credit constraints were a drag on output, as proxied by industrial production, for the entire
period under study. The effect on investment, however, is most significant only in the early phase of
the Depression from 1927 to 1929. This is an important finding, but one that needs to be contrasted
with other transmission channels and evaluated in relative terms against competing hypotheses of
the causes of the German slump. In subsequent research we aim to dive deeper into the determinants




Table A.1: Variable descriptions and data sources
Variable Description Start End Source Indicator
Ind Prod
Index of Industrial Pro-
duction (1928=100)


















1.1925 12.1934 Stat. Handb. No. 133
SA: Seasonally Adjusted; Stat. Handb.: Statistisches Reichsamt (1936, 1937)
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Figure A.1: Interest Rates in Germany
The figure shows the private discount rate of prime bankers acceptances in Berlin and the




Figure A.2 demonstrates the importance of allowing
Figure A.2: Stochastic volatility of shocks
A.3 Robustness
A.3.1 Foreign bond issuance
Investment, as our literature review above suggest, may have been driven by factors pertaining to the
financial markets more broadly as opposed to the banking system alone. Particularly, the reversal
of international capital flows in 1930/31 is a likely factor that put severe strain companies that
relied on long-term financing abroad (Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016). To examine this, we test
the robustness of our results using an indicator for market-based finance: the sum of domestic and
foreign bond issuance (available in: Statistisches Reichsamt (1936)).
Our results presented above are robust to the inclusion of this variable. Figure A.3 shows that
bond issuance did not meaningfully impact investment or industrial production, whereas figure A.4
shows that the impact of bank credit shocks on investment and industrial production remain signif-
icant after bond finance is included in the VAR-specification.17 This reinforces our argument that
bank credit was an important driver of macroeconomic conditions in Germany during the period at
issue.
17The VAR retains the same lag structure as used above
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Figure A.3: Impulse responses of industrial production and investment from bond issuance
A.3.2 Alternative investment series
We experimented with using domestic orders of new machinery as an alternative indicator for domes-
tic investment. As figure A.5 shows, the result of credit constraints being important is significant,
although the response of the alternative indicator is meaningfully larger.
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Figure A.4: Impulse responses of industrial production and investment from loans controlling for
bond issuance




Bayesian priors are a convenient way to provide some degree of restriction to what values the
parameters can take. In a time-varying model they are particularly important, because they also
determine the amount of time-variance that can take place (Primiceri, 2005).
The priors of the parameters in the TVP-VAR with data-based priors specified can be outlined
as follows
Define xt = [1, yt−1..., yt−p]′ and zt = In ⊗ xt. We then separate ztβt such that: ztβt =
ztα + ztαt + t. In this way, βt is separated into a time-varying and time-invariant part. Define
also κ = Nρ+ 1, the number of parameters.
A part of the estimation algorithm therefore differs from the Primiceri (2005) one in that we
sample βt in two steps: the constant and time-varying part. Start with the time-invariant part:










t zt) , V =
diag(τ1..., τm) and y
∗
t = yt − z
′
tαt
2. Sample τi that do not refer to intercepts (these are set to 2): τi ∼ IG(ρi1, ρi2). We set
ρ1i = κ1 + 0.5; ρ2i = 0.5× α2i + κ2.
3. Sample αt using Carter-Kohn algorithm, where the initial condition α0 is set to zero.
4. Sample Q ∼ IW (κ+ 1, 0.01× V )
Where N(·), IW (·) and IG(·) denote the normal, inverse Wishart and inverse gamma distribu-
tions, respectively. The estimation algorithm is as in Primiceri (2005) after β = α+αt and Q have
been sampled. See Korobilis (2014) for details.
With these definitions, the priors of the model can then be summarised as follows:













t zt) ; (10)
V = diag(τ1..., τm) and y
∗
t = yt − z
′
tαt (11)
τi ∼ IG(ρ1i, ρ2i) where (12)
ρ1i = κ1 + 0.5; ρ2i = 0.5× α2i + κ2 (13)
Q ∼ IW (κ+ 1, 0.01× V ) (14)
H0 ∼ N(Hˆ0, ch · IN ) (15)
A0 ∼ N(Aˆ0, ca · V (Aˆ0)) (16)
W ∼ IW (k2W ·N, IN ) (17)
Si ∼ IW (k2S · (i+ 1) · V (Sprior), (i+ 1)) (18)
The other underlying parameters to be estimated are outlined in section 4. Here, Si is the ith
row of matrix S. S is block diagonal such that: S1 = s1; S2 = [s2, s3] and so on. W is a diagonal
matrix with elements wi.
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For the data-based prior for τi, we set κ1 = 1 and κ2 = 20. As for the other priors, we use
fairly uninformative values: a¯ = 0; V (Aˆ0) = IN ; and V (Sprior) = IN . The other priors are also
consistent with the TVP-VAR literature. They are specified as follows: kS = 0.1; kW = 0.01; ca = 4
and ch = 4 (Primiceri, 2005).
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